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In the autumn of 2006, the World Trade Organization (WTO) published a long-
awaited verdict on a divergent regulatory treatment of genetically modiªed or-
ganisms (GMOs) by the United States and the European Union. Adjudicating
on the existence of indirect trade barriers, the Dispute Panel found against the
Europeans on all major issues. However, with economic power evenly matched
and differences deeply rooted, a resolution to the standoff has proved elusive.
Many scholars have analyzed the political, economic and legal dynamics of the
transatlantic conºict over genetic modiªcation (GM),1 but signiªcantly less at-
tention has been devoted to the deeper structural and often cultural reasons be-
hind the underlying divergence. Commentators have mostly drawn on political
economy and institutionalism to examine the multiple factors that have gener-
ated European and American regulatory frameworks.2 Although sociological
scholarship has highlighted the ethical, moral, and cultural drivers of public
attitudes,3 there tends to be only subdued recognition in the literatures on com-
parative politics and the global governance of agricultural biotechnology (ag-
biotech) that divergent cultural contexts may constitute an important explana-
tory element. From a cultural, constructivist perspective, agbiotech has an
impact not only on the material practices of agriculture, but it also potentially
imperils the cultural meanings attached to food production and consumption.
This has been a major, if submerged, motif of European resistance to GMOs.
A cultural-political approach, inspired by interpretive policy analysis,4
would highlight the importance of cultural context for political action. It thus
provides a complement to agent-centric approaches, illuminates the deeper
sources of regulatory trajectories, and may offer clues about the future of regula-
tion in the US and the EU. To ensure the analytical salience of cultural factors,
1. Murphy and Levidow 2006; and Lieberman and Gray 2008.
2. Bernauer 2003; Rosendal 2005; and Levidow and Carr 2009.
3. Wagner et al. 2001; and Schurman and Munro 2009.
4. Yanow 2000.
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this article goes beyond the notion of culture as “webs of signiªcance”5 and em-
phasizes widely held moral values and cultural identities.
Before outlining the cultural-political approach, however, the ªrst two sec-
tions brieºy summarize the transatlantic regulatory divergence over GMOs and
review political-economic and institutionalist explanations. The third section
inquires into the origins of public attitudes and contends that moral values and
cultural identities create the essential, enabling conditions for political mobili-
zation. Fourth, these insights are used to theorize the cultural politics of agbio-
tech and to show how values and identity-based perceptions shape the opportu-
nity structures for goal-oriented agents. Overall, European cultural contexts
structurally enable anti-genetic modiªcation (GM) discourses based on moral
claims to ºourish, while American anti-GM mobilization has mostly had to rely
on less effective utilitarian narratives.
A Brief Overview of Agbiotech Policies
Although farmers have selected agricultural crops for higher yields or environ-
mental robustness for thousands of years, modern biotechnology clearly repre-
sents a step-change. It allows scientists to directly manipulate DNA of individ-
ual cells in order to change their genetic make-up and endow plants with
desirable traits, such as greater tolerance to particular herbicides or drought
conditions. Since the commercialization of GM crops in 1996, global acreage
has continuously grown at single or double-digit rates. By the year 2010, it
amounted to 148 million hectares in 29 different countries, although the great
majority of crops (95 percent) were grown in only six countries (USA, Brazil, Ar-
gentina, India, Canada, China).6 In Europe, GM crops were planted on only
0.119 percent of agricultural land.7
The debate over agbiotech has often witnessed contradictory claims about
beneªts and costs/risks. For example, a beneªcial reduction in pesticide use
could be negated by target species developing resistance. But such utilitarian ra-
tionales have frequently been joined by more speciªc preoccupations. Although
contestation around the world has relied on multiple interests and discourses,
anti-GM movements in least developed nations, particularly in Africa, have of-
ten expressed their worries about the socio-economic consequences of large-
scale, “industrial” GM agriculture. Major emerging economies such as China,
India, Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico have also recognized the export value of
certiªed non-GM crops. But they have simultaneously developed domestic R&D
capacity and are devoting an increasing acreage to (mainly non-food) GM
crops.8 American NGOs and consumers have been most interested in the poten-
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tial economic, health and environmental beneªts—as well as potential adverse
impacts. And European movements have frequently highlighted the ethical and
cultural implications of GMOs.9
In regulatory terms, there has been remarkable stability in the US since the
1980s and rapid change in the EU between 1997 and 2003, followed by a pe-
riod of consolidation. In the US, authorizations of agbiotech products are chan-
neled through a long-established regulatory landscape, drawing on the expertise
of the US Department for Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A simple notiªca-
tion procedure is often sufªcient and a lengthier authorization process, which
includes a full environmental assessment, can be avoided. Once approved, there
are no provisions for systematic post-release oversight, as the crops are regarded
as “substantially equivalent” to their non-GM relatives.
In contrast, the EU’s 1997 Novel Foods Directive, which included rela-
tively moderate provisions on GMOs, quickly became meaningless as a wave of
public opposition swept through Europe and led several member state govern-
ments to resort to national bans on new GM crops. A raft of new regulations
emerged in the early 2000s, containing precautionary clauses on traceability
and mandatory labeling, post-release monitoring, and tough thresholds for tol-
erable “contamination” of non-GM products. A new central scientiªc body, the
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), was created in 2002 to re-establish
scientiªc credibility and produce authoritative risk assessments of new GM
products.10 But despite the elaborate regulatory framework, only two GM varie-
ties (MON810 maize and Amºora potatoes) have so far been approved for culti-
vation, and the Commission’s attempts to force countries to repeal their “safe-
guard” bans have failed.
Principal Explanations of Transatlantic Divergence
The existing literature on transatlantic regulatory differences has generated im-
portant insights. Perspectives drawing on international trade theory and politi-
cal economy, for instance, sometimes diagnose an instance of European protec-
tionism.11 Graff et al. thus argue that rational—and converging—interests of
several actor coalitions ultimately explain permissive US regulations and strin-
gent EU laws. European industry could continue to rely on its comparative ad-
vantage in chemistry (and conventional pest control products), while farmers
would, to some extent, be protected from cheaper imports of GM crops, and ac-
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tivist NGOs could increase their funding base by spearheading the anti-GM
movement.12
However, while the American regulatory context is dominated by a strong
pro-biotech coalition,13 there is little evidence that industry and mainstream
farming organizations in Europe played a major role in encouraging a stringent
regulatory framework. First, large European biotech companies, such as Syn-
genta or Bayer, compete with American counterparts in international markets
and pursue comparable commercial strategies. The interests of European agbio-
tech companies, irrespective of their size, were not served by the withering of the
European market for agbiotech products and the closure or relocation of some
of their R&D facilities.14
Second, only a few mainstream farming organizations were originally crit-
ical of agbiotech innovations, but emerging consumer hostility turned most
farmers away from GMOs.15 For example, in the now GM-skeptical France, both
government and mainstream farmers initially saw agbiotech as a strategic ad-
vantage for economic competitiveness.16 The intuition of political-economic
analysis remains partially correct, insofar as large biotech companies and the
European farming sector did not regard agbiotech innovations as necessary for
their economic survival in the short term. The European agricultural system, in
particular, has for some time been moving towards less intensive, multifunc-
tional practices which include associated environmental, social, and cultural
services.17 However, neither the globalized perspective of corporations nor the
wider agricultural policy agenda translated into acquiescence or even covert
support for stringent regulations.
The most persuasive approaches are concerned with the political-
economic mechanisms through which “countervailing forces”18—NGOs and
public mobilization—have overcome the inºuence of agbiotech-friendly actors.
Several scholars have demonstrated how public concerns about agbiotech cas-
caded through economic commodity chains and political systems.19 In the EU,
concerted NGO campaigns and rising public outrage managed to drive a wedge
between the biotech ªrms, which focus on research and marketing, and the
downstream architecture of the chain. Here, a highly concentrated sector of
food retailers is vulnerable to concerted consumer boycotts, while a low concen-
tration in European farm, seed, and grain-handling sectors makes it easy to dif-
ferentiate between GM and non-GM supply chains.20 By contrast, in the US,
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downstream actors in the commodity chain are relatively dispersed and not
overly vulnerable to competitive pressures from consumers. Most of the major
economic players in the US have also steadfastly opposed comprehensive label-
ing legislation, which may threaten to unravel a largely pro-GM economic archi-
tecture.21
Another important area of research looks directly at the policy-making
process and explores how different institutions and interests groups have inºu-
enced political decision-making. The core institutionalist argument is that the
combined structural leverage of political systems and regulatory institutions cir-
cumscribes the ways in which interest groups and the public can inºuence polit-
ical decisions. While US states have little say in the decision-making processes
of federal regulatory agencies, EU member states are both the principal agents of
enforcement and assume formal political roles in European regulatory commit-
tees and, ultimately, the Council of Ministers. A critical mass of skeptical mem-
ber states was instrumental in supporting a precautionary regulatory attitude.
Moreover, European citizens are represented by the European Parliament which
treasures its long-standing image of being the advocate of their concerns.22
A second strand of institutionalist scholarship analyses the path depend-
ence of regulatory trajectories and argues that “institutional choices taken at
critical junctures can persist or become ‘locked in,’ thereby shaping actors strate-
gies later in time.”23 Some of these historical institutionalists have theorized the
ideational components of institutions as regulatory “styles” in order to high-
light their built-in biases against socio-economic, cultural or ethical criteria.24
Thus, ªltered by a strongly science-centric US regulatory framework, these latter
concerns have seldom found their way into policy-making debates, except when
framed as special interests or personal ethical and religious preferences. In the
EU, as I argue below, these other issues have a considerable impact on both
public attitudes and policy-making.
While institutionalist approaches add important components to our un-
derstanding of the policy-making process, they are less successful in accounting
for the relatively swift regulatory changes in Europe witnessed at national and
supranational levels. Institutionalists often neglect the fact that the indispens-
able driver of regulatory reform has been the pressure emanating from public
opinion and political mobilization. It was growing public unease that legiti-
mated precautionary leadership by the EU’s Environment Directorate-General
in the mid-1990s when the advocates of biotechnology were increasingly mak-
ing the case for laxer regulation.
Political economy perspectives often recognize that it was consumer
power which motivated the elimination of GM products from European com-
modity chains and pushed the European Parliament and some national govern-
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ments to initiate a legislative transformation. In the US, the relative weakness of
agbiotech challengers and a lack of sustained public outrage allowed commod-
ity chains and institutional structures to maintain their established routines. In
sum, a combination of political economy and institutionalism yields a much
richer picture of regulatory dynamics. Yet it may still not inquire into the deeper
roots of transatlantic regulatory divergence—that is, the nature of public opin-
ion itself. Such an inquiry, which forms part of a broader cultural-political anal-
ysis, indicates that public opinion represents a conduit for deep-seated, his-
torically constituted sentiments that can be linked to moral judgments on
agbiotech.
Exploring the Roots of Public Opinion
Long-term public opinion trends conªrm that the scale and intensity of public
concerns have broadly corresponded to regulatory change or stability. In the US,
public attitudes reached a peak of concern around 2001–2002 when a coalition
of NGOs organized a concerted campaign.25 Yet, overall public attention proved
to be transitory. Over the years, in open questions about food labeling, the issue
of unlabelled GM products was a top concern for only 1–2 percent of respon-
dents.26 Agbiotech’s potential for producing healthier crops or reducing the ap-
plication of pesticides received the highest support, followed by possible envi-
ronmental/sustainability advantages. Overall, US public opinion has largely
been permissive and informed by utilitarian values.
In the EU, well before the food crises and alleged trigger events of the late
1990s, a groundswell of opposition could be detected, with a sizeable majority
of Europeans considering agbiotech applications as harmful and 85 percent of
them calling for stricter regulations.27 After the peak of public opposition during
1996–2000, attitudes towards agbiotech improved slightly. The Eurobarometer
2005 survey, however, showed that still only 27 percent of respondents regarded
GM food positively, and this ªgure dropped to 23 percent by 2010.28 Ultimately,
more revealing than numbers as crude indicators are the reasons behind the
public’s disquiet. These underlying reasons can only be identiªed by combining
survey data with qualitative methods and interpretive approaches. In this vein,
several hypotheses have been proposed to explain transatlantic divergence re-
garding public opinion.
Knowledge and Rational Risk Assessment
The “deªcit model” of the public highlights the lack of scientiªc knowledge
among Europeans. It is used to explain why the conventional diffusion model
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of technological progress, which predicts the steady societal uptake of bene-
ªcial new technologies, does not always correspond to agbiotech’s trajectory.
However, survey research has partly falsiªed this assumption by establishing
that—even in the US—textbook knowledge of genetics and GM food only mod-
estly explains more positive opinions.29 This strand of explanation is therefore
often complemented by conventional risk analysis. Because the media, NGO
coalitions and some scientists have emphasized the possibility of (potentially
unknown) risks from GMOs to human health and the environment, a rational
consumer may conclude that the risks simply outweigh the beneªts—in particu-
lar because the biotech industry has so far designed its products primarily for its
own proªt margin and for farmers’ yields.30
Although conventional risk analysis applies to some extent, it is not clear
that risks—even perceived risks—are the principal source of public disquiet in
the EU. The term “risk” is missing from many European focus group discus-
sions, while notions of danger ªgure more often and moral concerns appear to
predominate.31 Risk has nevertheless become a focal point in the political con-
troversy because regulators are drawn to its technical framing. Moreover, for
GM-skeptics the dominance of scientiªc discourse makes “invoking an uncer-
tain future . . . a comfortable way to voice non-speciªc concerns.”32
Institutional Trust
A second strand of analysis emphasizes the variable of institutional trust by
linking the European public’s anxiety about GMOs with a string of food safety
and medical scandals in the 1990s. The trustworthiness of government regula-
tors clearly suffered because they failed to predict the dangers posed by the out-
break of mad cow disease (BSE). The event-based argument about trust main-
tains that these regulatory crises shaped the public’s mood, delegitimized
ofªcial expertise, provided political opportunities for NGOs, and nourished a
sensationalist media.33 On the other hand, such regulatory crises can equally be
understood as non-deterministic through an interpretive lens because Europe-
ans’ loss of trust in regulators did not represent a sudden rupture. The sense of a
general food and agricultural crisis had pervaded European societies since the
1980s and the introduction of GMOs was interpreted as a radicalization of this
trend.34
None of the regulatory failures in the US caused a comparable amount of
public disquiet. The 2000 StarLink contamination scandal, in which a GM corn
variety solely approved for animal feed was detected in taco shells, opened up a
policy window for regulatory reform and started a debate over biosafety, crop
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segregation and coexistence.35 But neither this event nor studies in 1999 and
2001 appearing to show the toxicity of Bt corn (GM) to caterpillars of Monarch
butterºies captured the public imagination for long. Americans’ conªdence in
the safety of their food supply and work of regulatory agencies remains at rela-
tively high and stable levels.36
From a longer-term perspective, however, once trigger events are recon-
ceptualized as “catalysts,”37 the degree of trust in particular political actors be-
comes part of the broader cultural context. For instance, Vogel has used polling
data to argue that Americans’ faith in private corporations rose during the 1980s
and 1990s at the expense of public sector institutions and activist NGOs. He
claims that, if GMOs had been introduced in the 1970s, the public’s reaction
would have been less permissive.38 This argument implies that there are impor-
tant contextual factors that are often neglected when focusing on particular
events and interest groups.
The Catalytic, Cultural Context
If, catalysts (rather than triggers) offer a useful description, then the cultural-
structural argument should be elaborated. The trust hypothesis highlights that
an exact understanding of the mechanics of biotechnology is less important
than the perceived legitimacy of the creators and regulators of biotechnological
applications. However, as Peters et al. maintain, the more an issue is politicized,
the less statistically signiªcant the variable of institutional trust becomes.39
Therefore, rather than beginning with a high degree of trust in regulators or cor-
porations and inferring positive public attitudes towards GMOs, it is likely that
reverse causality applies and that the affective acceptability of a risk (or technol-
ogy) shapes the public’s trust in the regulator’s handling of agbiotech.40
Cultural factors are likely to have a signiªcant inºuence on public opinion
because judgments on acceptability are strongly affected by the broader socio-
cultural context—including dominant worldviews, morality, and cultural iden-
tities.41 Pardo and Calvo’s analysis of the 2002 Eurobarometer survey provides
support for this interpretation. The notion of risk did not signiªcantly affect
perceptions of usefulness or the moral acceptability of agbiotech, nor did it
correlate with the variables emphasized by the deªcit model. The authors
conclude that the public’s judgments were inºuenced not only by potential
practical beneªts, but also signiªcantly shaped by worldviews or “orienting
dispositions.”42
Some of the public’s objections in both the EU and the US were not the
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expression of largely unconscious cultural attitudes, but drew on ethical princi-
ples related to the socio-economic impacts of GMOs or to democratic account-
ability.43 At least in Europe, however, positing a sharp demarcation between dif-
ferent groups of opponents would misrepresent the amount of common moral
and political ground occupied by the anti-GM movement, especially its critique
of narrow conceptions of risk assessment. The success of public mobilization
did not principally reºect the convictions of a hard core of activists, but hinged
on the cultural values harbored by a majority of European citizens.
In sum, the standard tools of risk analysis offer an incomplete explanation
of public outrage which is less based on potential physical risks than on moral
vetoes originating in affective dispositions and cultural values.
Towards a Cultural-Political Analysis
Although some of the above perspectives acknowledge cultural values as one of
several important factors44, the literature on the transatlantic cultural divide
over agbiotech is mainly rooted in socio-legal studies, geography and anthro-
pology. Krenzler and MacGregor, for instance, posit that laws and regulations
generally evolve in response to changing conceptions of public policy, which
can be traced back to different cultural attitudes.45 Echols draws attention to Eu-
ropean culinary traditions originating in the Middle Ages and maintains that
“[c]ulture and tradition play a silent role in the regulatory process and the re-
sulting rules.”46
What makes these contributions distinctive is their level of societal (or
even continental) generalization and their emphasis on two central policy ar-
eas—food and agriculture—which are perceived differently on each side of the
Atlantic. Admittedly, generalizations on this scale are inherently problematic,
particularly in the light of internal American and European differences. But they
remain important heuristic tools to identify the potential driving forces, or cul-
tural foundations, of divergent transatlantic patterns. While acknowledging the
importance of national subcultures and local speciªcities, Wagner et al. inter-
preted conversations from country-level focus groups to signify that “[w]hen it
comes to the basic questions pertaining to nature and life, or fear of global tech-
nology and economic developments, the European public implicitly demon-
strate shared cultural roots [. . . which] transcend national boundaries, language
barriers and north-south contrasts.”47 Similarly, although the US contains myr-
iad subcultural formations and regulatory jurisdictions, it is still possible to de-
tect dominant cultural trends and associated processes of attitude formation.
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Agriculture and Food Cultures
In European countries, agriculture is generally regarded as an integral part of the
environment and the “middle landscape” where human activities and natural
processes must coexist. With its associated livelihoods, landscapes, and prac-
tices of food production, agriculture is a principal illustration not only of con-
siderable mixture and overlap in land use patterns,48 but also of accompanying
strong “ideological . . . linkages between rural and urban.”49 The pressures of na-
tional and global economic competition have further increased the appeal of
traditional agricultural landscapes. Such feelings are most acute in countries
where the consequences of agricultural modernization have only grudgingly
been tolerated. For instance, for many decades,
in memoirs, ªlms, novels, newspaper articles, academic conferences, and
countless town meetings, the French made it clear that they perceived the
disappearance of the old rural world not just as an economic or demo-
graphic challenge, but as a spiritual loss, a deep wound in the tissue of their
civilization.50
Because most European societies—geographically and psychologically—con-
tinue to emulate the agrarian nations they once embodied, they may be con-
trasted with a more utilitarian US context.
Thompson thus recounts the story of how the Jeffersonian ideal of the
small-holding and ªercely independent yeoman farmer ªrst appeared to
ºourish with the expanding American frontier and was then smothered by an
alliance of industrialist and progressive forces, united in a utilitarian embrace of
technology and productivity.51 With the exception of certain regions—especially
on the East Coast—most American farmland is sharply demarcated from the
surrounding industrial estates, suburban housing developments, and spaces of
wilderness. Neither regulators nor the public perceive strong positive externali-
ties from agriculture. If a broadly accepted public good is at stake here, it is the
production of low-cost food products for the nation. When asked about rural
amenities, most US respondents do not reveal a commitment to cultivated, cul-
tural landscapes. And due to a largely productivist farm lobby, outliers with al-
most “European” preferences—such as the state of Vermont and certain areas of
California—generally have little success in obtaining federal subsidies for con-
servation or alternative farming methods.52
A relative transatlantic divergence can also be discerned with regard to
food. Historically, the signiªcance of food products and dishes has not only
been tied to their life-giving properties, but also corresponds to inherent human
practices of “meaning-making.” However, the trend towards modernization
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through standardization and globalization clashes with the cultural associa-
tions of food. By reducing or even eliminating its propensity to carry connota-
tions of social distinction, religious symbolism, cultural belonging and identity,
processes of modernization risk triggering a backlash. In many European re-
gions, GM foods are thus often understood as a radicalization of the industrial
production process, alluding to efªciency, industrialization, and homogeniza-
tion. Food cultures frequently represent an essential component of protest
against the industrialization of food—and of support for natural products and
the return to more traditional culinary roots.53
For example, the fusion of food and national identity has attained such a
degree in Italy that unwanted innovations (such as GM food) are regarded as
alien and “un-Italian.” Besides posing a threat to artisanal production methods
and the reputation of Italian products, “[o]ne widespread feeling is that Italians
do not need to have the genes of the Mediterranean diet mixed in the laboratory
with those of arctic ªsh.”54 Even in the strongholds of convenience food, such as
Britain,
there is a fast-growing “slow food” movement; after decades of legal adulter-
ation of food, there is now a burgeoning market for natural foods; after de-
cades of enticing consumers to eat world cuisines, there is now a counter-
move to return to localism, regional foods and real cooking.55
The growing interest in the provenance of food and the proliferation of labels
and trademarks reºects the rediscovery of “local notions of taste.”56
American food culture shows commonalities with some European
countries—especially regarding food safety, nutrition, and price—but its mod-
ern evolution distinguishes it from the traditionalist culinary preferences that
remain inºuential in many European societies.57 The nationalization of Ameri-
can cuisine during the twentieth century did not raise the standards or glorify
authentic ingredients as cultural heritage. Instead, it ushered in the “mass mar-
ket of industrial cuisine”58 whose utilitarian motives are complemented by sym-
bolic associations and images of pleasure. Food advertisement campaigns carry
a host of implicit signals about health, vitality and beauty. And these are em-
bedded in a framework of basic American cultural themes: capitalism, industri-
alism, democracy, pluralism, individualism, leisure, and youthfulness.59
However, a burgeoning local food movement is now making inroads into
a largely homogenized food system. A coalition of consumer and justice-
oriented organizations is attempting to build a broader national consensus
around local and regional food systems. It has managed to establish numerous
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farm-to-school/college programs and helped to double the number of “ofªcial”
farmers’ markets to 7,175 by 2008.60 The demonstration of “culinary capital”
through detailed knowledge of quality food products and dishes is also becom-
ing increasingly desirable in some sections of society.61 Nevertheless, increasing
attention to the provenance of food may turn out not to be as intensely associ-
ated with images of tradition and/or nature as in Europe. The appeal of local
food may sometimes be fruitfully combined with the potential utilitarian bene-
ªts of GM crops.62
The Cultural Politics of Agbiotech
Naturally, these cultural contexts do not directly cause speciªc outcomes, but
they are highly inºuential in shaping the degree of public support for GMOs by
offering particular cultural-political opportunities and foreclosing certain alter-
natives. Thus, by restructuring economic commodity chains, a high level of pub-
lic outrage in Europe has greatly contributed to the observed regulatory strin-
gency. But how should the overall signiªcance of cultural factors for the politics
of agbiotech be assessed?
The answer depends on how culture is conceptualized. Theorists empha-
sizing the autonomy of political factors or the creative power of discourses hold
that public attitudes towards agbiotech are socially constructed, insofar as they
correspond to various framings of the issue. Montpetit and Rouillard maintain
that “culture should not be reduced to public attitudes measured by opinion
surveys or to essential values” because it is “dynamic and always contested.”63
The cultural context might thus be harnessed by what Clapp and Fuchs describe
as “discursive power”—the process of “constituting and framing policies, actors,
and broader societal norms and ideas” by playing on perceptions of trust and
legitimacy.64
As the previous section argued, however, agri-food traditions in the US
and European countries are not so contradictory to be wholly discursively mal-
leable because they are rooted in historically constituted values and practices.
And, in the European case, they are often linked to powerful national and re-
gional identities. A cultural analysis of anti-biotech mobilization goes beyond a
discursive approach because it examines the deeper reasons behind the success
or failure of particular narratives. Discourses are successful in mobilizing citi-
zens when they resonate with pre-existing cultural values and identities.65
The structural, constitutive quality of cultural context means that the ob-
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jectives of political actors are neither freely conceived nor do they perfectly mir-
ror those of rational agents. Even political elites cannot be regarded as existing
entirely apart from their cultural context(s), although, in the longer term, deter-
mined actors can help transform this background through reºexive action, thus
leading to social learning and solidifying new cultural values that will one day
be perceived as constitutive “common sense.” Yet, in the short term, a prevailing
cultural context is a considerable constraint on goal-oriented political actors.
Many biotechnology companies have been acutely conscious of the differ-
ent cultural contexts deªning their markets. The British company Zeneca Seeds
thus carefully selected its ªrst product (American GM tomato puree) in 1996 for
entry into the European market, provided clear labeling, and was rewarded with
initial success. Shortly afterwards, however, it watched powerlessly when the US-
based Monsanto corporation crossed the Atlantic and refused to label its ship-
ments of GM soybeans. Monsanto tried to respond to mounting criticism, but
its advertising campaign was badly timed and ill-conceived. The discursive
power it intended to project backªred and fuelled the growing public debate.
It is equally important to emphasize that European NGOs have not created
the broader societal skepticism towards agbiotech. Instead, they have acted as
“opportunistic actors piggy-backing on pre-existing negative public perceptions
of agri-biotechnology.”66 In Europe, numerous social movements and NGO co-
alitions operate at local, national and supranational levels of policy-making and
present a variety of carefully tailored campaign messages. While health and en-
vironmental risks are a core staple of the campaign—boosting the movement’s
scientiªc and political legitimacy—evocative rhetorical devices have equally
ºourished, ranging from Britain’s Prince Charles’ defense of nature as the realm
of God to criticism of “aggressive” American capitalism (regarding Monsanto)
and savvy combinations of environmental and moral discourse, such as “ge-
netic pollution,” “contamination,” and “Frankenfoods.”67 These non-utilitarian,
often openly moralistic discourses resonated with European publics in a way
that cannot be attributed solely to regulatory crises and issues of trust.
The structural role of agricultural traditions and food cultures as symbolic
(and material) ampliªers of national cultural identities was a major catalytic
inºuence. For instance, agbiotech’s closeness to the practices of industrial agri-
culture provoked the ire of conservationists in Britain. “This type of genetic
modiªcation,” English Nature, a major UK government agency, wrote in 1999,
“will make farming even more intensive and is undesirable in the British coun-
tryside where farming and wildlife must co-exist.”68 Agbiotech was also de-
picted as a threat to artisanal farmers whose plight had long preoccupied
the public’s consciousness. Agricultural and food traditions are inextricably
connected in some European regions, making it relatively easy for small farm-
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ers’ organizations—such as Confédération Paysanne in France or Coldiretti in
Italy—to build alliances with consumer and environmental groups. Evoking the
agro-food “patrimony” of their nations, activists rhetorically linked GM foods
and crops to the decline of family farms and the spread of low-quality “fast”
food.69
Of course, these cultural dynamics do not apply to all European societies
to the same degree. While similar themes and campaigning coalitions emerged
in many countries (such as Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Austria, Germany, Luxem-
burg, Ireland, Slovenia, Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Bulgaria), there is no
convincing explanatory framework to account for subdued public awareness
and debate in a number of countries with strong traditional food cultures (e.g.,
Portugal, Spain) or burgeoning organic agricultural sectors (e.g., Sweden, Den-
mark, Finland). Moreover, public opinion trends do not always correlate with
the voting patterns of national governments at the European level,70 indicating a
degree of political autonomy—at least from latent public opposition.
The available literature indicates that agbiotech has not yet been politi-
cized in countries like Portugal and Spain, but surveys also show that public
support has gradually diminished. Public debate has equally begun to intensify
in the Nordic countries where, until relatively recently, GM crops had virtually
been absent from the marketplace. Finally, perhaps the clearest outlier among
European countries is the Netherlands where, although public support remains
modest, the socio-economic imprint of a strong biotech sector and export-
oriented agribusiness is not counterbalanced by a traditionalist food culture.
Here, as well as in hitherto GM-skeptical Britain, claims about economic com-
petitiveness and environmental sustainability, as well as ethical arguments
about global food supplies, are increasingly inºuential.71
In the US, spearheaded by a broad coalition of NGOs, the anti-GM move-
ment emphasized socio-economic arguments about the corporate take-over of
the food chain and the risks posed to small and organic farmers. But the central
message aimed at fomenting a consumer revolt and concentrated on the poten-
tial utilitarian risks for human health and the environment.72 The coalition’s de-
mands included more stringent evaluations of potential adverse impacts and
the mandatory labeling of GMOs. These demands seem decidedly modest, but
one should not underestimate the structural signiªcance of a comprehensive la-
beling system (or even voluntary non-GM labels) in unleashing “consumer sov-
ereignty” and potentially forcing segregated supply chains for GM and non-GM
crops.73 Here, both material forms of pro-GM power and discursive strategies
“normalizing” agbiotech products have been important.
Despite failing to fundamentally reform the US regulatory framework,
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campaigners did score some limited victories. The new organic food labels es-
tablished in 2002 allowed for an implicit certiªcation of GM-free food, and the
FDA issued more stringent guidance on pre-market food safety evaluations in
2004. A ºurry of court cases and bills in state legislatures yielded a patchwork of
rudimentary segregation and labeling laws.74 A small number of states from
New England have acted as frontrunners, with Maine allowing voluntary label-
ing of GM-free products and Vermont passing legislation on mandatory GM
seed labels. But Vermont’s governor vetoed a strict liability law that could have
made coexistence of non-GM and GM crops impractical. Besides the strong po-
sition of organic farming in New England, “European-style” landscapes and
farming systems have clearly fostered an unusually strong “cultural identiªca-
tion” with food and agriculture.75 Elsewhere—for instance in California, Arkan-
sas, and Missouri—economic motives have taken center stage, inducing state
legislators to preempt the cultivation of GM rice in order to reassure valuable ex-
ports markets in Asia.
These developments notwithstanding, a turning point has not been
reached in the US. Efforts are continuing, but the generally tenuous connections
between food and agriculture, on the one hand, and national or regional identi-
ties on the other, constitute an important element of an overall explanation.
Moreover, cautious support for GM technology has a long history in the US en-
vironmental movement.76 Together with well-established mainstream NGOs fo-
cusing on the protection of wilderness, the great majority of Americans do not
venerate agricultural landscapes, but national parks which represent “a powerful
cultural statement fusing notions of nature and nation.”77 Regarding American
food culture, even critiques do not refer to convenience food as being in some
way “un-American.”
In sum, cultural-political dynamics will continue to shape American and
European agbiotech regulations. Although both pragmatic regulatory change
and a longer-term cultural evolution cannot be ruled out, the cultural factors re-
viewed here will likely remain essential for understanding regulatory stability
and transformation.
Conclusion
This article has made the case for embedding existing perspectives on the evolu-
tion of US and European agbiotech regulation in a broader cultural-political ac-
count which privileges contextual over agent-centric analysis. By pursuing a
constructivist perspective and by highlighting the catalytic potential of cultural-
political opportunities, the article aims to shed light on the deeper sources of
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regulatory systems and, by extension, on the persistence of the transatlantic di-
vide. Nonetheless, existing perspectives on regulatory politics constitute an
essential element of an overall explanation. Political economy approaches iden-
tify public opinion, political mobilization, short-term interests, and the struc-
ture of commodity chains as critical elements, but they tend to rely on rational
choice and conventional risk analysis to explain the nature of political op-
position. Institutionalists draw attention to the entrenchment of organizing
principles or regulatory traditions and focus on policy windows and related
opportunities.
However, neither approach adequately explains why Europeans’ concerns
about agbiotech were tangible well before the years of controversy and have not
signiªcantly abated since then—or why GM foods and crops have become a
“sounding board”78 for a host of issues ranging from the fear of globalization
and dilution of national identities to the defense of integrated “agri-cultural”
landscapes and food cultures. This broader cultural context—often neglected
because it cannot be easily deªned or measured—must be considered because
the public often relies upon pre-existing moral values and cultural identities to
make sense of GM technology.79
Nor is there strong evidence that Europeans’ perceptions were successfully
fashioned or imposed by political elites or corporate actors. Certainly, cultural
values and national identities are constantly being reproduced through state in-
stitutions and the media. Most of these efforts, such as Italy’s state-sponsored
food education program—entitled “Culture that Feeds”80—have traditionalist
objectives that aim to preserve particular societal perceptions of food and agri-
culture. In most European societies, rather than undergoing radical discursive
change, it appears as if traditional conceptions of cultural identity, “natural-
ness,” and moral worldviews have largely endured. In the language of construc-
tivism, as O’Mahony and Skillington have phrased it, “innovations in the social
construction of reality are never so transformative as to be culturally unrecog-
nisable . . . discourse formations do not so much complement wider systems of
cultural or political belief as respond to them in a creative manner.”81
An exploration of cultural contexts also helps to illuminate why in the US,
despite some potential regulatory crises, the tailored message of environmental
and health risks was insufªcient to create widespread public outrage, except for
a small number of states and regions. Most Americans privilege low price and
convenience over paying heed to potential, albeit fundamentally uncertain,
risks. US regulators, backed by inºuential corporate actors from the Food Chain
Network, will arguably continue on the path of technological innovation unless
substantial, new risks are uncovered.
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European NGOs, by contrast, were capable of mobilizing large sections of
European societies by adding moral discourses to the customary stock of (utili-
tarian) risk-based arguments. Evidently, these campaigns played out differently
in each country. Further research on intra-European differences would have to
examine both national cultural contexts and pluralist interest politics to con-
struct a more ªne-grained framework for understanding public perceptions of
and governments’ positions on agbiotech. Such insights would be especially im-
portant at a time when the EU’s carefully designed supranational system of
scientiªc advice and political regulation may be entering another reformist
phase. In the summer of 2009, a group of eleven member states proposed the
partial renationalization of agbiotech policy-making in order to enable individ-
ual countries to legally uphold national bans, even if based on ethical or cul-
tural grounds.82 By July 2011, the European Parliament had produced a list of
environmental and socio-economic criteria to ensure a ªrmer legal footing for
national bans. Several member states—such as France, Germany, Britain, Bel-
gium, and Spain—have so far rejected the entire regulatory enterprise. But if
this initiative were to succeed, civil society mobilization and the proliferation
of GM-free regions may induce some countries to either institute explicit bans
on GM varieties or further strengthen their national coexistence regulations to
discourage the planting of GM crops, for instance by imposing stiff penalties for
even inadvertent contamination of non-GM ªelds. A small number of pro-GM
governments might, in turn, hope to desensitize consumers by allowing the cul-
tivation of GM varieties under lax coexistence legislation, thus undercutting the
very notion of non-GM crops and products. However, it remains uncertain
whether these countervailing trends would enable GM crops to be planted more
widely and GM foods to be stocked by supermarkets alongside non-GM
alternatives.
While European consumers may also be susceptible to a logic of utilitar-
ian beneªts83—such as lower prices, environmental or health advantages—the
cultural values and identities associated with food and agriculture mean that
Europeans’ cognitive threshold is higher than that of US consumers. As
agbiotech supporters have begun to frame their innovations in ethical terms—
for instance in relation to alleviating world hunger or resilience to climate
change—they may succeed in engaging European societies more positively. This
adapted message will not resonate at the same deep level of cultural identity,
but it may re-brand agbiotech as an essential element of humanistic “progress.”
Without a strong (ethical or utilitarian) rationale for agbiotech products, the
culturally motivated veto of many European citizens is unlikely to weaken
substantially.
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